Readings in Analytic Philosophy

Ahh! So, I am supposed to be working on my thesis over the summer. My objective right now
is to examine arguments for and against impossible worlds and their application to the philosophy of mind (specifically David Chalmers’ The Conscious Mind). Additionally, I have found some interesting findings in color vision science [...]

The Not-so Idealized Linguistic Anthologist
Consider Mary, who lives on a planet far far away, similar to Earth in many ways except for one difference. For as long as humans have existed on Mary’s planet, they have spoken a single language. No varying dialects exist on this planet. We would say that [...]

Ontological relativity an Unacceptable Consequence of Denying Intension
First, let us consider what the importance of interpretation is. Some have dismissed Quine’s thesis as trivial or incoherent (On Quine 73). We might wonder if we are not more concerned with use. We are in our daily lives more concerned with use. Quine’s [...]

Many physicists have noted that if you think that you understand the theory of quantum mechanics, then you really don’t; likewise, philosophers have noted both the importance and difficulty Quine’s positions in “Ontological Relativity” (Hahn 139). I would like to examine Quine’s position on the relativity of ontology as an unacceptable consequence of abandoning [...]

Private Language
Kripke’s account of the private language argument is thus vitiated by his unargued reliance on ideas which Wittgenstein argued against. This of course does not show that he has not hit upon a new and more interesting notion of private language than that expounded here.
I typically enjoy opinionated introductions; however, when writers make general [...]

Haecceities might be non-qualitative, irreducible, unique thisnesses out of which a world or the entirety of worlds might be made. By non-qualitative, we mean properties that are expressed with such referential devices as proper names, adjectives and verbs, indexical expressions, and referential uses of definite descriptions. Examples of non-qualitative properties are “being Jessica [...]

Kripke says that if x = y, then necessarily x = y. This follows directly from the indiscernibility of identicals, AxAy ((x = y) → (Fx → Fy)), and necessity of self-identity, □(x = x). By substitution and a bit of first order logic, we arrive at the conclusion: AxAy ((x = y) [...]