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Archive for June, 2006

In January 1970, Saul Kripke gave his now classic lectures at Princeton University, leaving the philosophical community stunned and perplexed. In the last of these three lectures, which have been published in Naming and Necessity, Kripke argued that his ideas about naming and necessity have some surprising implications for the philosophy of mind. [...]

Our epistemic situation with respect to pain

The apparent contingency of identities like ‘water is H2O’ was explained away, according to Kripke, by noting that cases where we are in the same epistemic situation with regards to water and appear to be experiencing water, are really cases where we are in fact experiencing something other than water. Thus, it only appears that [...]

Consciousness is a Natural Kind

Kripke’s account of natural kinds is parasitic upon how he thinks names refer; so, I will explain the central distinction he introduces in his theory of naming, and then, examine how his theory of naming for natural kinds differ from his account of proper names. Some identity statements fix a referent while others provide [...]

H2O no longer simply water?

Site recommendation: H2O PlayLists
Why H2O? I don’t know, but this really cool app allows users to share readings on a particular topic of intellectual interest. I haven’t played around with this app yet, but it seems like it could be great for those who want to keep up to date with the current [...]

Philosophers of mind are concerned with the status of the mind as a type of substance. Does the mind somehow arise from the physical processes of the brain? Or is the mind its own unique type of substance?
Physicalism is the thesis that everything, including the mind, is a physical substance. David Chalmers [...]